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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to provide a short survey of some of the most
popular abstract argumentation frameworks available today. We present the gen-
eral idea of abstract argumentation, highlighting the role of abstract frameworks
in the argumentation process and review the original Dung frameworks and their
semantics. Then a discussion on generalizations of these frameworks is given,
focusing on structures taking preferences and values into account and approaches
where not only attack but also support relations can be modeled. Finally we re-
view the concept of abstract dialectical frameworks, one of the most general sys-
tems for abstract argumentation providing a flexible, principled representation of
arbitrary argument relations.
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1 Introduction
Assume you have to make an important decision, for example concerning a new job
you have been offered. The conclusion you have to reach will hardly be a simple de-
ductive one. Most probably you will construct arguments in favor of the new job (e.g.
better salary, better chances in the future) and arguments against it (further away, bigger
workload and thus less time for your family). In the end the pro and con arguments will
be weighed against each other and your decision determined.
Given that this kind of argument–based reasoning and decision making is ubiq-
uitous, it is not surprising that argumentation itself has emerged as a scientific field.
It studies how to model arguments and their relationships, with the ultimate goal to
solve conflicts in the presence of diverging opinions. Thus argumentation has also been
referred to as reasoning tested by doubt3. Argumentation has become a major focus
of research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) over the last two decades [14, 16, 59]. It is
strongly connected and highly beneficial to various other AI subfields, in particular
knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, and multi–agent systems. It has
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been successfully applied to legal reasoning, which makes use of argumentation prin-
ciples to formulate legal cases as arguments [15]. Moreover, it has proved valuable in
decision support for resolving conflicts between different opinions [4, 33] and in the
context of dialogues and persuasion [48, 57]. Finally, argumentation techniques can be
found in several expert systems from such different areas as medicine [40,45] or eGov-
ernment [8].
Within argumentation one can distinguish two major lines of research: logic–based
and abstract approaches. The former (see for instance [16]) takes the logical structure
of arguments into account and defines notions like attack, undercut, defensibility etc.
(see e.g. [43]) in terms of logical properties of the chosen argument structures. In con-
trast, abstract approaches - which will be the topic of this paper - consider arguments
as atomic items, focusing entirely on the relations between them. Consequently, it is
assumed that the arguments and the relevant relations between them have already been
constructed, usually from a given background knowledge base. The obtained argumen-
tation system is then evaluated on the abstract level, yielding possibly alternative sets
of (abstract) arguments which may be collectively accepted. Finally, these results are
interpreted in terms of the original knowledge base. This three–step creation, evaluation
and interpretation process is known as the argumentation process or instantiation–based
argumentation [24, 26]. The advantage of this method is that it provides a high degree
of modularity, so that the way of solving a given problem is kept on an abstract level,
detached from a particular representation in the modeling language used in the knowl-
edge base. In this paper we will provide an overview of the most popular argumentation
systems for this abstract level.
The most prominent abstract systems are due to Dung [34]. They come equipped
with various types of semantics used for their evaluation. In a nutshell, Dung’s frame-
works (AFs for short) are directed graphs with the vertices being the abstract arguments
and the directed edges corresponding to attacks between them. Conflicts are then re-
solved using appropriate semantics. The different semantics reflect the different intu-
itions about what can be considered reasonable, thus providing a suite of calculi of op-
position. They produce acceptable subsets of the arguments, called extensions, that cor-
respond to various positions one may take in the light of the available arguments. Cru-
cial here are the concepts of conflict–freeness and admissibility. Based on them more
advanced semantics have been defined, ranging from Dung’s original stable, preferred
and grounded semantics to the more recent semi–stable, ideal and cf2–semantics [9].
Recent studies [2, 24] have shown, however, that within the argumentation process
the construction of proper argumentation frameworks can cause much more concern
than expected. Attention must be given to avoid the risk of violating some natural ratio-
nality postulates in the overall instantiation-based argumentation process. Indeed, gen-
erating the right argumentation structures is the crucial step here for yielding reasonable
— and, in particular, consistent — output.
In general, the more expressive the modeling languages become, the more involved
the instantiation step grows. Consequently, the generated AFs may turn out to be far
from natural. For instance, recent formal systems like ASPIC+ [51,58] and Carneades [42]
provide various useful syntactical features, in particular a separation between strict and
defeasible rules, different types of premises and proof standards, preferential informa-
tion and the like. This makes the modeling language very expressive yet results in a
rather complicated instantiation, and it is not always easy to see whether the instantia-
tion “does the right thing”.
However, our view is that the general idea underlying the abstract, instantiation–
based approach to argumentation is still valid. The modularity of this method provides
the flexibility needed in response to changes in the modeling languages. What, as we
believe, the mentioned results suggest is that Dung’s argumentation frameworks may
not necessarily be the best target systems for the instantiation. Indeed, their expressive
abilities are limited due to the fact that we have only a binary conflict at hand. This
can make modeling e.g. collective [52] or supportive [28] relations unpleasant if not
problematic.
Currently there are two research directions that aim to address such problems and
to bridge the gap between the modeling languages and AFs. The first one, called meta–
argumentation [17, 50], allows us to stay within the well established setting of Dung.
However, it comes at the cost of auxiliary arguments which are required to represent
relations other than attack. The second one focuses on extending AFs by equipping
them with more expressive concepts to model the aforementioned situations, such as
preferences or support relations. Compared to the meta–argumentation approach, the
main challenge of the new frameworks is to correspondingly generalize the semantical
concepts. They must not only fit the extended frameworks, but also remain intuitive
and relatively compatible with the original structures (see [55] for a discussion). The
primary objective of this paper is to give an overview of the currently available general-
izations of Dung’s framework. In the interest of space, we will keep our discussion on
a rather informal level but try to raise awareness of the difficulties which arise in this
vivid and interesting branch of research in the argumentation community.
This paper is structured as follows. We start with a theoretical background on Dung’s
systems in Section 2. Then we proceed to describing generalizations that focus on pref-
erence and value–based reasoning in Section 3 and ones that study different types of
relations between arguments (see Section 4). Please note that we do not aim at a com-
plete survey. Rather, we present what we consider interesting representatives of differ-
ent kinds of generalizations. In Section 5 we present abstract dialectical frameworks,
so far the most general enrichments of AFs. We conclude the paper with a short list of
some generalizations we could not describe in detail and pointers for future work.
2 Dung’s Argumentation Frameworks
In his seminal paper [34], Phan Minh Dung showed that it is possible to analyze accept-
ability of arguments in an abstract way, independently of where the arguments come
from and how they are generated. Moreover, he aimed at representing different types of
nonmonotonic approaches in a uniform setting. To this end, he introduced a surprisingly
simple concept: abstract argumentation frameworks.
Definition 1. A Dung abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair (A,R), where
A is a set of arguments and R ⊆ A×A represents the attack relation. We say x attacks
y iff (x, y) ∈ R.
An AF is thus nothing but a directed graph with a specific intuitive interpretation
of nodes and links. As there are no restrictions on the attack relation, cycles, self–
attackers, and so on, are all allowed. Arguments do not have any particular structure
and the precise conditions for their acceptance are defined by the semantics. In what
follows we will present several such semantics, originally defined by Dung.
Let F = (A,R) be an AF. Assume a rational agent accepts a subset S of A. What
properties would we expect S to satisfy? First of all, it seems reasonable to require
consistency, i.e. that the arguments in S do not attack each other. We say S ⊆ A is
conflict–free (in F ) whenever there are no x, y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R. However,
this is still insufficient. In real life we are often forced to counter the arguments of the
opponents that have an opinion conflicting with ours. We say a set of arguments S ⊆ A
is admissible (in F ) whenever S is conflict–free in F and S is able to defend itself
against outside attacks. By this we mean the following: if there is an x ∈ A and some
y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ R (an element of A attacks an element of S), then S must
contain some element z defending y, that is (z, x) ∈ R for some z ∈ S.
Admissible sets are good candidates for the sets of arguments a rational agent may
adopt. However, not all of them are interesting. The empty set, for instance, is admis-
sible for each AF. Not accepting arguments without any reason can certainly not be
viewed as rational. This is why Dung focuses on further notions. A set of arguments
S ⊆ A is complete iff it is admissible and already contains all arguments defended by
S. In other words, each argument whose attackers are attacked by S must be in S. This
notion can be further strengthened to preferred extensions which simply are the (sub-
set) maximal admissible sets. A somewhat stronger notion than preferred extensions are
stable extensions. Stable extensions are conflict–free subsets of A which attack each ar-
gument not in S: a conflict-free set S is a stable extension if for each x ∈ A \ S there
is y ∈ S such that (y, x) ∈ R. Please note that contrary to the other notions discussed
here, stable extensions are not guaranteed to exist.
Another interesting semantics is given by the grounded extension. It contains all and
only arguments whose defense can be traced back to any of the unattacked arguments.
Every framework has precisely one such set, even if it is empty. The grounded extension
S of an AF can be generated iteratively as follows: starting with the empty set, we first
include in the set S all those arguments which are not attacked at all. We then remove
them from the framework along with all arguments T attacked by S (together with
all attacks between arguments from S and T ). We continue like this, adding to S in
each step arguments unattacked in the reduced AF and remove them, until we reach a
fixpoint, that is, until no further unattacked arguments can be found this way.
Example 1. Here is a short example. Let F1 = (A,R) with A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}
and R = {(a1, a2), (a3, a2), (a3, a4), (a4, a3), (a4, a5), (a5, a5)} (see Figure 1). The
conflict-free sets of F1 are {a1, a3}, {a1, a4}, {a2, a4} and all their subsets. The ad-
missible sets of F1 are ∅, {a1}, {a3}, {a4} as well as {a1, a3} and {a1, a4}. Note that,
for instance, {a2, a4} is not admissible since a2 is not defended by that set against its
attacker a1 (it is however defended against a3). We have three complete extensions of
F1: {a1}, {a1, a3} and {a1, a4}. The latter two are the preferred extensions, however,
only {a1, a4} is stable. Finally, the grounded extension consists of the single argument
a1.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Fig. 1. Sample Dung framework.
Please note that various further alternative definitions of AF semantics have been
defined, see [9]. Most prominent are the labeling–based approaches [25] that instead of
generating sets of accepted arguments, provide us with three–valued (truth, false, un-
dec) interpretations. However, for the purposes of this paper the notions we introduced
are sufficient. Moreover, we do not aim here to discuss computational properties such
as complexity or expressiveness. We refer the interested reader to [11, 36, 37]. For an
overview of systems for abstract argumentation, see [29].
3 Preferences and Values
In decision making scenarios we are often faced with pro and con arguments, and our
decisions are based on preferences among these arguments. For this reason it is quite
natural to apply preference handling techniques in argumentation. In fact, this has been
done even before abstract argumentation as such has emerged, see for instance [60],
where the strength of an argument is measured in terms of the specificity of the under-
lying information [56]. Including the preference information in argumentation frame-
works not only allows us to model the problem more accurately, it also reduces the
number of extensions we may obtain.
Generalizations of AFs which include preferences were first introduced in [3,5]. The
so–called preference based argumentation frameworks (PAFs) are defined as follows:
Definition 2. A preference based argumentation framework (PAF) is a tuple (A,R,≥)
where A is a set of arguments, R ⊆ A× A is the attack relation and ≥ ⊆ A× A is a
(partial or total) preorder representing preference.4
The evaluation of arguments is then based on a simple idea: whenever a strictly less
preferred argument a attacks a more preferred argument b (a is strictly less preferred
than b, denoted b > a, if b ≥ a and not a ≥ b), then the attack (a, b) ∈ R is simply
disregarded. This means that the given PAF PF = (A,R,≥) is used to generate a
standard AF F = (A,R′) where R′ = R \ {(a, b) | b > a}. This AF is then used to
define the semantics of the PAF.
Bench-Capon’s value based argumentation frameworks (VAFs) [12] are based on
similar ideas. However, here it is assumed that arguments promote specific values, and
the preferences are among these values rather than between the arguments themselves.
4 Note that depending on the approach, the values/preferences of arguments might form different
types of ordering. Although PAFs use a preorder, the mentioned specificity relation is not
necessarily a preorder, see [65].
Definition 3. A value–based argumentation framework (VAF) is a tuple (A,R, V,
val , valprefs) whereA is a set of arguments,R ⊆ A×A is the attack relation and V is
a nonempty set of values. val : A→ V is a function mapping arguments to values and
valprefs ⊆ V × V is a (transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric) 5 preference relation.
Again, the evaluation of a VAF is based on the generation of an AF. Here attacks are
disregarded whenever the attacked argument promotes a more preferred value than the
attacker. VAFs were further generalized to include different audiences which may dis-
agree about the preferences among values. A comparison between PAFs and VAFs can
be found in [18, 46].
In many argumentation contexts preferences or values themselves are a matter of
debate. It is thus useful to have frameworks in which it is not only possible to reason
and argue with preferences but also about preferences. This observation led to the de-
velopment of extended argumentation frameworks (EAFs) [49]. Here, reasoning about
preferences is modeled by allowing an argument not only to attack other arguments but
also other attacks. Like this, an attack (a, b) can be dynamically disabled if, say, an
argument is accepted which intuitively expresses that b should be preferred to a.
Definition 4. An extended argumentation framework (EAF) is a tuple (A,R,D) where
A is a set of arguments, R ⊆ A × A represents the attack relation and D ⊆ A × R
is the defence attack relation for handling preferences. Moreover, if (x, (y, z)) and
(x′, (z, y)) are in D, then (x, x′) and (x′, x) are in R.
The main idea behind EAFs is that preferences can be based on arguments themselves
and as such they generate a more advanced conflict relation where other attacks can be
overridden. The constraint included in the definition states that arguments representing
opposite preferences should also be mutually in conflict in the framework. Although the
definitions substantially differ from the ones in PAFs and VAFs, the intuition remains
similar. Instead of attacks, we focus on defeats with respect to some set S: we say that
x defeatsS y if (x, y) ∈ R and there is no z in S such that (z, (x, y)) ∈ D. Conflict–
free extensions then disregard attacks that are not defeats, assuming that the attack is
not symmetric. Intuitively, admissibility is also limited to the successful attacks (i.e.,
defeats). Defense is now based on defeats, i.e. given a set S, for every y such that y
defeatsS x where x ∈ S, there exists an argument z ∈ S s.t. z defeatsS y. What is
unique in EAFs is that this semantics is later strengthened by ensuring a particular type
of defense for the (z, y) defeat itself, referred to as reinstatement. Based on this, all
further semantics follow naturally and generalize the original ones by Dung; see [49]
for further details.
The initial idea behind evaluating the preference (value–based) frameworks was to
disregard a conflict if the attacked argument was stronger than its attacker (or if the
attack itself was attacked in case of EAFs) and focus on the remaining relations. This
treatment can result in extensions that do not follow the traditional intuition behind
conflict–freeness and depending on how we understand preferences, they can be seen
as intended [49] or not [5]. In the latter case, the cited work also proposes a new ap-
proach towards semantics for PAFs that is meant to fix such issues and as such presents
5 We keep the original definition here, even though some of the properties of valprefs imply one
another.
a different type of reasoning than in the Dung’s frameworks. Instead of being driven
by acceptability, it makes use of a so-called dominance relation to establish whether a
set of arguments (candidate for an extension) is better than another. The initial relation
is described in terms of postulates that incorporate conflict–freeness and the behavior
of attacks in the PAF setting. It is then further adjusted depending on the (Dung–style)
semantics that one wants to generalize. The extensions are represented by the maximal
elements of the dominance relation. While preferences assign different levels of impor-
tance to arguments, the relation between arguments remains purely conflicting. In the
next section, we take a look at systems which relax this restriction.
4 Relationships Beyond Attack
Dung’s frameworks consider only a single relationship among arguments, namely at-
tack. In various contexts it is natural to go beyond conflict. In particular, the ability to
model various notions of support appears useful. This observation has led to the de-
velopment of so-called bipolar argumentation frameworks [27, 28] where both of the
relations are modeled.
Definition 5. A bipolar argumentation framework (BAF) is a tuple (A,Ratt, Rsup)
where A is a set of arguments, Ratt ⊆ A × A represents the attack relation and
Rsup ⊆ A×A represents the support relation. We require that Ratt ∩Rsup = ∅.
Including a new type of relation requires a careful adaptation of the existing se-
mantics. The combination of attack and support leads to indirect attacks, referred to as
complex attacks in [28]. For instance, there is a supported attack from a1 to b if there
is a sequence of support links from a1 to an and an attack from an to b. There is a sec-
ondary attack from b to an if there is a sequence of support links from a1 to an and an
attack from b to a1. A mediated attack from b to a1 takes place if there is a sequence of
support links a1 to an and an attack from b to an. For the generalization of Dung–style
semantics to BAFs these indirect, complex notions of attack then need to be taken into
account adequately. There are various ways of doing this, and what is adequate depends
on the specific interpretation of the support.
Example 2. We will now show some of the complex attacks. LetBF1 = (A,Ratt, Rsup)
with A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} , Ratt = {(a3, a4), (a6, a5)} and Rsup = {(a1, a2),
(a2, a3), (a4, a5)} (see Figure 2). The normal attacks are depicted with normal lines,
supports with dashed and complex attacks with dotted.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Fig. 2. Sample BAF.
Here, a2 supports a3 which attacks a4, creating a supported attack from a2 to a4.
Another supported attack on a4 comes from a1, a supporter of a2. There is a secondary
attack from a3 to a5 and a mediated one from a6 to a4.
In [28] an analysis of three different types of support is carried out: deductive sup-
port, necessary support and evidential support. The former two are quite strong notions
and, as shown in that paper, dual to each other. If a deductively supports b, then b must
be accepted whenever a is accepted. Necessary support between a and b means that
accepting a is a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) precondition for accepting b.
The notion of evidential support was first developed in evidential argumentation
systems (EASs) [54]. This approach builds on a generalization of Dung AFs in [52]
where sets of arguments rather than single arguments may be needed to attack another
argument. In addition, the frameworks introduce a distinction between so–called prima
facie arguments and ordinary arguments. The former can be accepted without further
requirements. The support of the latter needs to be rooted in such special arguments to
be considered valid. Otherwise it not only cannot be accepted, it is not even considered a
valid attacker. Thus the resulting semantics are stronger versions of the Dung semantics
that impose a type of a grounding on the arguments.
We refer the reader to the original papers for further details and to [30] for a survey
on various types of support in argumentation. To summarize this section, research on
bipolar argumentation frameworks has certainly demonstrated that going beyond the
attack relation is interesting and useful. On the other hand, it is apparent from the litera-
ture that there is no such thing as a single interpretation of support. One can easily think
of further interpretations, not among the three we briefly discussed. For instance, an ar-
gument may strengthen another one without guaranteeing its acceptance as required for
deductive support. One can also think of situations where different notions need to be
combined in flexible ways. Finally, in all bipolar frameworks so far, there is the hidden
assumption that conflict is stronger than support. This means that no matter the support
an argument receives, it still has to be defended from incoming attacks. It thus appears
useful to have frameworks that — rather than being built on a fixed interpretation of
support — make it possible to specify exactly, for each argument, in what way support
and attack interact. This is exactly the functionality provided by abstract dialectical
frameworks which we will discuss in the next section.
5 Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
The abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) have been proposed by Brewka and Woltran
[23] as a generalization of Dung-style AFs. The idea behind them was to allow not only
abstract arguments, but also highly flexible and abstract relations. This is achieved by
adding to each argument a a specific acceptance condition Ca. More formally, an ab-
stract dialectical framework is a directed graph whose nodes represent arguments, state-
ments or positions which can be accepted or not. The links represent dependencies: the
status of a node s only depends on the status of its parents (denoted par(s)), that is,
the nodes with a direct link to s. In addition, each node s has an associated acceptance
conditionCs specifying the exact conditions under which s is accepted.Cs is a function
assigning to each subset of par(s) one of the truth values t, f . Intuitively, if for some
R ⊆ par(s) we have Cs(R) = t, then s will be accepted provided the nodes in R are
accepted and those in par(s) \R are not accepted.
Definition 6. An abstract dialectical framework is a tuple D = (S,L,C) where S is
a set of statements (positions, nodes), L ⊆ S × S is a set of links and C = {Cs}s∈S is
a set of total functions Cs : 2par(s) → {t, f}, one for each statement s. Cs is called the
acceptance condition of s.
In many cases it is convenient to represent the acceptance conditions as proposi-
tional formulas, as described in [38]. For this reason we frequently use a logical repre-
sentation of ADFs (S,L,C) where C is a collection {ϕs}s∈S of formulas expressing
the Boolean functions from Definition 6.
Acceptance conditions can specify arbitrary relationships between arguments and
their parents, thus allowing us to model complex interactions. A case where an argu-
ment a can only be successfully attacked if two attacking arguments b and c are jointly
accepted can be easily expressed with a condition ϕa = ¬b ∨ ¬c. Dung’s standard AFs
can be recovered as the special case where the acceptance condition of an argument,
say a, is defined as the formula ¬c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬cn where c1, . . . , cn are all arguments
attacking a.
Example 3. A representation of the Dung framework from Figure 1 in terms of an
ADF is depicted in Figure 3 and formally given as ADF 1 = (S,L,C) with S =
{a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}, L = {(a1, a2), (a3, a2), (a3, a4), (a4, a3), (a4, a5), (a5, a5)} and
C = {a1 : >, a2 : ¬a1 ∧ ¬a3, a3 : ¬a4, a4 : ¬a3, a5 : ¬a4 ∧ ¬a5}.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
> ¬a1 ∧ ¬a3 ¬a4 ¬a3 ¬a4 ∧ ¬a5
Fig. 3. Dung–style ADF
As the definition of acceptance conditions suggests, ADFs can naturally express
much more. Consider the framework depicted in Figure 4:ADF 2 = (S,L,C) with S =
{a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}, L = {(a1, a2), (a3, a2), (a3, a4), (a4, a3), (a5, a4), (a6, a5),
(a6, a6)} and C = {a1 : >, a2 : a1 ∨ a3, a3 : ¬a4, a4 : ¬a3 ∨¬a5, a5 : a6, a6 : ¬a6}.
The relation between a2 and its parents is an example of a group support similar to
the one presented in EAS [54]. This means that accepting either a1 or a3 is sufficient
for a2, we do not have to commit to both. Attack by a set of arguments, i.e. where more
arguments are needed for a successful attack [52] is carried out by a3 and a5 on a4.
Finally a5 is (necessary) supported by a6.
The semantics of ADFs in the original paper [23] have later been generalized and
further developed in various directions. The initial approach and the one described
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
> a1 ∨ a3 ¬a4 ¬a3 ∨ ¬a5 a6 ¬a6
Fig. 4. Sample ADF
in [55] fall into the extension–based category, while the works in [20, 61] are labeling–
based. In the first approach, a conflict–free extension is a set of arguments having their
acceptance condition satisfied. Admissibility generalizes the original intuition from
Dung by making sure that the extension has the power to discard undesired arguments.
In the labeling–based approach, the definition of ADF semantics is based on the no-
tion of a model. A (two-valued) interpretation v – a mapping from arguments to the
truth values t and f – is a model of an ADF whenever v maps exactly those statements
to t whose acceptance conditions are satisfied under v. The definition of grounded,
complete, preferred and stable semantics is then derived from an analysis in terms of
three–valued interpretations where an additional truth value u (undefined) is used. A
key notion is the following consensus operator: for an ADF D and a three-valued in-
terpretation v, the operator ΓD returns the (three-valued) interpretation ΓD(v) which
assigns to each statement s the consensus truth value for its acceptance formula ϕs,
where the consensus takes into account all possible two-valued interpretations w that
extend the input valuation v. The relevant semantical notions are derived from this op-
erator. For instance, the grounded model of D is defined as the least fixpoint of ΓD.
For further technical details we refer the reader to [20, 61]. A comparison between the
extension and labeling–based approaches can be found in [55]. However, we want to
emphasize that the ADF semantics are actually proper generalizations of the original
Dung semantics in the sense that they treat ADFs corresponding to AFs in exactly the
same way as defined by Dung.
ADFs also provide a new handle on the treatment of preferences [1, 6] and values,
respectively audiences [13]. As shown in [23], preferences on links between statements
can directly be used in the definition of acceptance conditions. In [20], a treatment of
preferences among arguments in the style of PAFs has been introduced. A prioritized
ADF (PADF) consists of a prioritized set of arguments, a set of support links and a set of
attack links. A PADF is then compiled to a standard ADF. The approach is shown to be
a proper generalization of PAFs. Similar generalizations of VAFs are straightforward.
The same paper also proposes a new approach to argumentation with dynamic pref-
erences which, rather than being given in advance, are a matter of debate themselves.
In a nutshell, dynamic preferences are handled as follows. We first guess a (stable, pre-
ferred, grounded) extension M . We assume some nodes in M carry preference infor-
mation. We extract this information and check whether M can be reconstructed under
this preference information, thus verifying that the preferences represented in the model
itself were taken into account adequately to construct the model.
Brewka and Woltran have shown how legal proof standards - which play an es-
sential role in legal reasoning - can be modeled using ADFs [23]. Moreover, in [21]
ADFs were used to provide a reconstruction of the much-cited Carneades system [42].
The reconstruction not only puts Carneades on a safe formal ground. Even more im-
portantly, it allows the somewhat unrealistic restriction of the original system to acyclic
argumentation scenarios to be relaxed. This shows the potential of ADFs as systems for
generalizing not just abstract frameworks, but also more logic–based approaches.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have described the field of abstract argumentation and provided an
overview of the currently available frameworks that extend Dung’s initial system by
incorporating preferences and relations beyond attack. In what follows we give a few
more pointers to the literature; a more detailed discussion of these works had to be
omitted due to space constraints. Concerning preferences, such further works include
audience specific argumentation frameworks in which arguments can promote multi-
ple values [46], uniform argumentation frameworks [7], and multi-contextual prefer-
ence based argumentation frameworks [18]. Other generalizations incorporate proba-
bilities [44, 63] and certain forms of weights [32, 35, 47]. Concerning the frameworks
focusing on generalizing the relations between arguments, we mention here three fur-
ther representatives. First, the SETAF [52] approach formalizes the concept of sets of
attacking arguments. Second, in the AFRA (argumentation frameworks with recursive
attacks) approach [10], not only arguments but also attacks can be attacked (similar
to the EAF approach discussed in Section 3 but without any limitations and motivated
from a different angle). Finally, there exists another type of bipolar structures – abstract
frameworks with necessities – that focus on necessary support [53].
As we have seen ADFs go even further trying to capture many of the aforemen-
tioned generalizations at once. Closely related to ADFs are constrained argumentation
frameworks (CAFs) [31], Weydert’s hyperframeworks [64] and equational argumenta-
tion networks (EANs) [41]. The main difference between CAFs and ADFs lies in the
fact that the former use the relations to filter the extensions rather than exploiting them
during the extension computation, as it is done in ADFs. The motivations behind the
hyperframeworks and EANs are close to the one behind ADFs. However, they leave a
lot of detail to the user and lack the combination of simplicity and flexibility that ADFs
provide.
Coming back to the entire argumentation process as described in the introduction,
let us mention that research on instantiations in the context of ADFs [62] has recently
emerged. Also efficient implementations [39] are now available making ADFs a valu-
able tool to experiment with and also to better understand “weaker” generalizations of
Dung’s AFs. ADFs, as we believe, do provide a highly useful interface between mod-
eling languages on one hand and AF-based implementation techniques on the other.
In other words, ADFs act as argumentation “middleware” bridging the gap between
highly complex argumentation applications and the core abstract frameworks of Dung
(as higher order programming languages are used to implement algorithms but are by
no means intended to replace machine code). This view is also backed up by polyno-
mial compilations from ADFs to AFs which preserve at least some of the ADF seman-
tics [19]. As in the meta-argumentation approach, additional arguments are needed for
this purpose. Even if one is willing to stick to AF-based implementation techniques,
ADFs thus provide a useful interface between the more complex non–abstact modeling
languages on one hand and the purely Dung layer on the other.
As to future work, it seems fruitful to continue the recent research on ADF seman-
tics [20,55] with a particular focus on the limits of expressiveness. Another interesting,
so far unexplored aspect is to switch the language of the acceptance conditions. So far,
these conditions describe relations between arguments in terms of standard proposi-
tional logic. Moving to temporal, modal, or even nonmonotonic logic for the interpre-
tation of the acceptance conditions offers new exciting research perspectives in the area
of formal argumentation.
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